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Evidence of Excess Comovement in US Mergers
Abstract
This paper considers changes in market comovement of merging US rms. Compar-
ing the expected to the actual post merger comovement, we nd that the post merger
beta exhibits excess comovement with the acquiring rm. This suggests that the rms
comovement is at least partly determined by its investors. We nd that the excess co-
movement is signicantly greater in cash transactions, when target shareholders tender
their entire stake, than in pure stock transactions. Additionally, we document that the
excess comovement is greater when the target is included in the S&P 500 as a result
of the merger.
JEL classification: G34, G12, G02.
Keywords: Mergers, Comovement, Segmentation, Method of Payment, Index Inclusion.
1 Introduction
Classical asset pricing theory predicts that in a frictionless market the return required by
investors depends on the comovement of the rms assets with the market. In an international
context, there is evidence that the comovement changes signicantly when the location of
listing changes (Froot and Dabora, 1999, and Chan, Hameed and Lau, 2003) and when a
company is acquired by a foreign rm (Brealey, Cooper and Kaplanis, 2010). These results
suggest that stock comovement with the market is at least partly determined by the rms
investors and that international markets are segmented.
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In the average merger, the majority of the target shareholders stake is acquired and
therefore the post merger shareholder base is predominantly comprised of the acquiring
rms shareholders. Given this, and if the market comovement is a¤ected by the rms
investors, we expect the post merger market comovement to be shifted towards the acquiring
rm. This paper examines US mergers to provide further evidence that investors partially
determine stock comovement by showing a signicant shift in market comovement towards
the acquiring rm.
We estimate the pre merger comovement of the target and the acquirer and use these
estimates to calculate an expected post merger comovement. We then compare the expected
post merger comovement to a post merger estimate of the actual comovement. When the
acquirer exhibits larger comovement with the market than the target (the prediction is
asymmetric depending on the relative riskiness of the target and the acquirer), we nd that
the expected post merger comovement is 1:09 while the actual post merger comovement with
the market is 1:18. This represents an excess comovement with the acquiring rm of 8:26
percent. Additionally, the implied e¤ect on the targets market comovement is an increase
in beta of 0:27 or 34 percent relative to the pre merger beta.
Given that investors a¤ect market comovement, the degree of excess comovement is
increasing in the fraction of equity tendered by target shareholders. Therefore, cash mergers
(which imply that target shareholders do not retain any stake in the merged rm) should
be associated with signicantly greater excess comovement. For cash mergers, the di¤erence
between the actual and expected post merger beta is 0:20 (compared to 0:09 for the overall
sample). In cash transactions, target comovement increases by 0:32 or 46:1 percent relative
to the pre merger beta. In contrast, for 100 percent stock deals (when there is less exit), the
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excess comovement is statistically and economically insignicant.
Building on work by Vijh (1994), Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) argue that there
is a "habitat" of investors that invest in S&P 500 stocks. This implies that the rms
shareholders change as a result of inclusion into the S&P 500 and therefore the comovement
with the S&P 500 increases. Given that there is a S&P 500 habitat, we expect the excess
comovement towards a S&P 500 acquirer to be larger when a target rm is included into
the index as a result of the merger. Our results support this conjecture and additionally we
verify that our results are not driven by an index inclusion e¤ect.
It is well documented that investors show preference over rm characteristics like indus-
try and geographic location.1 Therefore, target shareholders that have a preference for a
particular industry are more likely to sell their shares as a result of a cross industry merger
than an intra industry merger. We nd some support for this, in inter industry mergers
(when the acquirer has a larger beta than the target) the excess comovement towards the
acquirers comovement is 11:71 percent while for intra industry mergers it is 3:77 percent and
statistically insignicant. Similarly, there is no excess comovement in within state mergers
while in intra state mergers the excess comovement is 9:03 percent.
The ndings of this paper suggest that there is not only cross-border segmentation,
but also segmentation along other dimensions such as index membership and geography.
However, there are a number of possible alternative explanations for our results that we
have to consider. First, on average mergers are associated with increases in leverage and this
1Empirically it has been documented that investors prefer stocks in their geographic vicinity (Coval
and Moskowitz, 1999 and Huberman, 2001). Additionally, it has been shown that shareholders exhibit a
preference for stocks from industries that they have experience from (Döskeland and Hvide, 2010).
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could potentially explain the excess comovement.2 However, for leverage changes to explain
our results, it must be the case that leverage increases when the beta of acquirer is greater
than the beta of the target and that leverage decreases when the beta of the acquirer is
smaller than the targets beta, since in the rst case we have a higher than expected post
merger beta and in the latter a lower than expected post merger beta. In fact, for transactions
in which the beta of the acquirer is lower than the targets, we nd that leverage increases
modestly. Additionally, we conduct multivariate sorts that illustrate that excess comovement
is independent of the change in leverage. Finally, in our regression analysis, we nd that the
change in leverage is insignicantly related to the excess comovement and does not a¤ect
our results qualitatively.
Second, some mergers result in synergies which might transform the assets and therefore
also the comovement of these assets with the market. However, for synergies to explain our
results it must be the case that the synergy asset has a riskiness that is above that of the
expected post merger beta when the acquirer has a higher beta than the target and vice
versa when the beta of the target is greater than that of the acquirer. Further, it must be
that the transformation of these is rather rapid since we measure the post merger beta over
100 weeks after completion. Finally, in regression analysis we verify that synergies are not
driving our results.
Third, following completion it is possible that the riskiness of the assets of the target
is transformed to become similar to the riskiness of the assets of the acquirer. However,
this risk transformation needs to be rapid (see above). Additionally, it has to be greater in
2Ghosh and Jain (2000) study leverage increases in mergers. They nd that leverage increases by a
modest 6.3% on average. We nd similar leverage increases in our sample (see Figure 2).
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transactions that are associated with greater shareholder exit (e.g., cash deals). Furthermore,
we consider the progression of the rms post merger comovement and do not nd evidence
of a gradual transformation of the riskiness of the rms assets.
Prior work has provided evidence of segmentation by examining both returns and mar-
ket comovements.3 Concerning comovement, Chan, Hameed and Lau (2003) document a
decrease in comovement with the Hong Kong and an increase in the comovement with the
Singapore Stock Exchange following a change in listing from Hong Kong to Singapore. Most
closely related to us, Brealey, Cooper and Kaplanis (2010) document cross-border segmen-
tation by providing evidence of excess comovement in cross-border mergers. They nd that
following a merger, the comovement with the exchange where the acquiring rm is traded
increases while the comovement with the exchange of the target company decreases. We
build on their results by providing evidence of segmentation by considering mergers of US
rms. Another paper that illustrates within-border excess comovement is Pirinsky and Wang
(2006). They show that when rms change the location of their headquarters they start co-
moving more with rms in the geographic vicinity of their new headquarters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our data
sources, sample selection criteria and methodology. We start Section 3 by considering sorts
illustrating the relation between the pre merger and post merger betas. We then verify these
3In terms of return segmentation, early work showed how investment barriers imply return premiums. The
barrier to investment can be investment restrictions (Black (1974) and Stulz (1981)) or lack of information
(Merton (1987)). In terms of empirical evidence, Hong and Kacperzyk (2009) show that "sin" stocks exhibit
abnormal performance that cannot be attributed to traditional factors. Additionally, Sloan and Lehavy
(2008) and Bodnaruk and Östberg (2009) show that rms with less recogntion (segmented rms in terms of
investor awareness) have higher returns.
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results using regression analysis. In Section 4 we show that our results are not driven by
asset transformation and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Methodology
Our sample of mergers and acquisitions comes from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC).
We only include transactions between rms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq. More-
over, our sample covers the period from 1980 to 2008.4 We only consider completed transac-
tions where the target and acquiring company are publicly traded. Additionally, we require
the target and acquirer to be di¤erent rms (i.e., we exclude all repurchases). This gives
us a total of 8; 411 mergers. We obtain stock return data from the CRSP daily les (this
reduces our sample to 6; 160).
In estimating comovement (see next section), we follow Brealey et al. (2010) and require
100 weeks of return data for the target and the acquirer prior to the run-up period and for
the merged company after completion. This leaves us with 3; 510 deals.
Further, we only consider deals where 100 percent of the target company is owned by
the acquirer after the merger. We only include targets which have a market capitalization
above 50 million (Hackbarth and Morellec, 2008). In order to evaluate if the post merger
comovement is biased towards the acquirer, we require that the targets assets to represent
a non-insignicant proportion of total assets of the merged company.5 Therefore, we only
4SDC includes transactions from before 1980 and after 2008, but these transactions are excluded due to
other restrictions.
5Brealey et al. (2010) do not have to implement such a restriction since they examine comovement with
respect to di¤erent markets whereas we consider one market, but examine whether the acquirer determines
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consider mergers in which the target company has a market capitalization that is at least 25
percent of the acquirer. Finally, we exclude deals which involve at least one nancial rm
(SIC code 6000 to 6999). This leaves us with a total of 712 deals.
To control for the change in leverage due to the merger we calculate the leverage change
as dened by Ghosh and Jain (2000). Leverage is the scal year-end ratio of debt to total
rm value. We measure debt as the book value of long-term debt (Compustat Item dltt)
added to the debt in current liabilities (Compustat item dlc). Total rm value is the book
value of debt added to the market value of equity. The change in leverage is dened as the
di¤erence in leverage between the scal year end before the announcement of the merger and
the scal year end after the completion of the merger.
We draw on Brealey et al. (2010) in calculating the synergies of the merger. Synergies
are the market adjusted increase in market capitalization of the acquirer and target in the
six weeks surrounding the announcement (three before and three after) as a percentage of
the pooled rm.
Figure 1 describes the time line of our research design.
Insert Figure 1 here
We estimate the individual comovement of the acquirer, target and merged rm with
the market (the value-weighted CRSP index) over the 100 week pre run-up period (acquirer
and target) and over 100 weeks post completion (merged rm). To avoid confounding e¤ects
of news announcements and rumors, we exclude eight weeks prior (run-up) to the merger
a disproportionate share of the comovement.
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announcement (Schwert, 1996). This involves running the following weekly regression for
the acquirer, target and merged company:
Rj;t = j + jRm;t + "j;t
where j is a rm index, Rj:t is the return on the rm and Rm;t is the return on the CRSP
value weighted index. To reduce the e¤ect of outliers, we winsorize our betas at the one and
99 percent level.
We calculate the expected merged beta as:
E() =
MVA
MVA + (1  )MVT A +
(1  )MVT
MVA + (1  )MVT T (1)
where A and T are the pre merger comovements of the acquirer and target, respectively
and MV refers to the market value of equity. If the acquiring rm has a signicant toehold,
the comovement of the target is already partly reected in the comovement of the acquirer
(Brealey et al., 2010). Put di¤erently, if only a small stake is acquired in the target due to
the toehold then the comovement of the acquirer is not expected to change signicantly. To
control for this, equation (1) adjusts for the fraction of the target held by the acquirer at
announcement ().
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our key variables.
Insert Table 1 here
On average, target companies are roughly half the size of acquiring companies. Target
companies represent roughly 35 percent of total pre merger market capitalization. We can
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see that on average leverage increases from 23:91 percent pre merger to 31:74 percent post
merger. Our descriptive statistics indicate that total synergies only represent a small fraction
of the pre merger rm. Additionally, in most deals the acquirer does not have a toehold.
The pre merger betas of the target and acquirer are similar and close to one. Turning to the
expected beta (E()), as predicted, it is between the target and acquirer beta. Finally, the
post merger beta (M) is greater than the expected beta which is consistent with a leverage
increase.
We use SDC to classify the following methods of payment: cash, stock, mixed and other.
Dummy variables Cash, Stock, Mixed and Other take the value 1 if the deal is only nanced
with cash, only with stock, a mix of both and if other methods of payment are used.
3 Empirical Findings
A Univariate Analysis
This paper tests whether the investors contribute to the comovement of the rm with the
market. To do so we examine mergers and acquisitions. Given that target investors exit
following the merger, the post merger comovement of the rm should be closer to the co-
movement of the acquirer than expected. Additionally, the greater the fraction of target
shareholders that leave as a result of the merger, the closer the post merger comovement
should be to the comovement of the acquirer.
In this section we provide univariate analysis of the relation between the expected and
the actual merged beta. Our central hypothesis is that the comovement of the merged
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rm is closer to the comovement of the acquirer than expected. When the comovement
of the acquirer with the market is greater than comovement of the target with the market
(A > T ), we expect the actual merged beta to be greater than the expected beta (M >
E()). Hence, implying that the acquiring rm exhibits undue inuence (relative to its
market capitalization) on the comovement of the merged rm. Likewise, we expect the
actual merged beta to be lower than the expected beta (E() > M) when the beta of the
target is greater than the beta of the acquirer.
Figure 2 presents our pre merger betas (acquirer and target) and our post merger expected
and observed beta. Panel A considers deals for which A > T while Panel B considers deals
for which T > A.
Insert Figure 2 here
Examining Panel A; it is evident that the actual merged beta is greater than the expected
beta indicating excess comovement with the acquirer. Turning to Panel B, we see that the
actual merged beta is slightly below the expected beta.
Table 2 compares the actual to the expected betas in our overall sample, split according
to whether A is higher or lower than T , and tests whether the excess comovement is
signicant.
Insert Table 2 here
When A > T , the expected beta is 1:09 compared to the actual merged beta of 1:18.
The di¤erence between the actual and expected merged beta (M E(), excess comovement)
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is statistically signicant at the one percent level and represents a shift towards the acquirers
beta of 8:26 percent relative to the mean expected beta. This understates the e¤ect on target
betas since targets represent on average less than half of the merged rm.
To evaluate the economic impact on target betas, we calculate an implied target beta
based on our estimates. We replace for E() in M = E() by using equation (1) and
rearrange to obtain an expression for the implied target beta,
ImpT =
MVA + (1  )MVT
(1  )MVT
bM   MVA(1  )MVT bA (2)
Using our estimates bA, bM we calculate an implied target beta for each transaction. The
implied target beta (ImpT = 1:05) is on average 34:2 percent larger than the pre merger
estimated target beta (T = 0:78) when A > T .
Turning to the deals in which T > A, we see that the excess comovement is negative
( 0:01) which is in line with our prediction. However, the di¤erence is not economically or
statistically signicant. One potential explanation for this nding is that in order to observe
excess comovement we require that target investors sell their shares. Therefore, splitting our
results according to method of payment (see next section) provides for a more powerful test.
A.1 Method of Payment
If equity comovement is determined by the rms investors, then the greater the fraction
of target shareholders that exit following the merger, the greater the excess comovement
(Brealey et al.) with the acquirer. In mergers that are paid only with cash, all target share-
holders exit whereas in stock-for-stock mergers no target shareholder has to exit. Therefore,
we expect the excess comovement with the acquirer to be signicantly larger in cash mergers
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than in stock mergers. Figure 3 presents pre merger and post merger betas of our cash deals
according to whether A > T (Panel A) or T > A (Panel B).
Insert Figure 3 here
Both panels of Figure 3 are indicative of the post merger comovement having shifted
signicantly towards the comovement of the acquirer.
Panel A of Table 3 presents univariate analysis of pre and post merger betas of cash
deals.
Insert Table 3 here
When the comovement of the acquirer is greater than the comovement of the target,
the expected beta is 0:97 while the actual beta is 1:18 implying that the tilt towards the
acquiring rm is 21:65 percent relative to the expected beta. Additionally, this di¤erence is
statistically signicant at the one percent level. Further, the implied target beta calculated
using equation (2) is 46:1 percent larger than the pre merger estimated target beta. Turning
to the deals where T > A, we nd an expected beta of 0:93 whereas the actual post merger
beta is 0:84, the di¤erence of  0:09 represents a  9:68 percent deviation from the expected
merged beta. The implied target beta is now 27:5 percent lower than the pre merger beta.
This di¤erence is statistically signicant at the 5 percent level.
Panel B of Table 3 presents our results for pure stock transactions. It is striking that
irrespective of whether the target beta is higher or lower than the acquirer beta, the di¤erence
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between the actual and expected post merger beta is never statistically nor economically
signicant.
A.2 Index Inclusion
Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) document that the comovement with the S&P 500
increases after the inclusion into the S&P 500 and Vijh (1994) documents an increase in
comovement with the CRSP value-weighted index following inclusion to the S&P 500. Given
that investors have preferences and mandates to invest in particular stocks, some investors
will be forced to liquidate their holdings of a company once it is included into the S&P
500 (e.g., small cap funds). This implies a greater degree of exit following inclusion and
therefore we would predict greater excess comovement with the acquirer for those targets
that are acquired by a S&P 500 rm. In this section, we examine the excess comovement
of S&P 500 included targets and verify that our previous results are not driven by index
inclusion. Index composition data is obtained from COMPUSTAT. In our sample we have
61 targets that are included into the index as a result of the merger.
Insert Table 4
In Panel A of Table 4 we consider those deals in which the target is included into the
S&P 500.6 Considering those deals for which A > T we nd a large shift towards the co-
6There are very few deals in which the acquirer is included into the S&P 500 as a result of the merger
(33). However, for these deals we would expect excess comovement to be smaller since there will be forced
exit on the side of the acquirer.
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movement of the acquirer. When considering implied target betas, the mean (median) rm
experiences an increase in beta of 23:8 (38:8) percent. Unfortunately, the di¤erence is not
statistically signicant, perhaps due to the low sample size. For the deals in which A < T ,
the shift towards the acquirers comovement is larger. The mean (median) excess comove-
ment (M   E()) is  0:15 ( 0:13) which equals a deviation of 14:56 (12:04) percent. The
e¤ect in terms of implied target betas is larger, the mean (median) target rm experiences
an decrease in beta of 46:6 (40:1) percent. These di¤erences are statistically signicant at
the one percent level. Overall, the results of this panel are consistent with the ndings of
Barberis et al. that document a S&P 500 "habitat." Put di¤erently, the excess comovement
seems to be larger when the target is included in the index as a result of the merger.
To illustrate that our results are not driven by index inclusion, in Table 4 Panel B we
consider those cash deals (where we predict and document the strongest e¤ect) in which
neither the acquirer nor the target experience a change in inclusion status from the start of
the pre to the end of the post merger estimation windows. In the A > T case, we nd
a large positive and statistically signicant excess comovement while when T > A, it is
negative and statistically signicant. Hence, our results are qualitatively unchanged after
removing index inclusions.
In summary, Table 4 documents that we observe an index inclusion e¤ect consistent with
previous work, but that this e¤ect cannot explain our ndings.
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A.3 Industry
Investors often have a preference over what industry they invest in (e.g., Barberis and
Shleifer, 2003). This implies that we expect to have a greater fraction of target shareholders
exiting when mergers are across industries (e.g., industry specic mutual funds) rather than
within industry. Hence, we predict the excess comovement towards the acquirer to be greater
in across industry mergers than in intra industry mergers.
Table 5 splits mergers into those in which the acquirer and target have the same SIC
code and those in which the SIC code of the target and the acquirer di¤ers.7
Insert Table 5 here
Panel A of Table 5 considers across industry mergers. When A > T the excess comove-
ment with the acquirer beta is 11:71 percent relative to the expected beta. Similarly, the
economic e¤ect in terms of implied betas is large and statistically signicant at the one per-
cent level. The excess comovement is negative when we consider T > A, but economically
and statistically insignicant.
In PanelB, we do not nd any evidence of excess comovement for within industry mergers,
which is consistent our prediction.
7We have also used the S&P sector classication as our industry measure. The results are qualitatively
unaltered, but with a signicantly smaller sample of across industry mergers.
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A.4 Geography
There is a signicant amount of evidence documenting that investors have a strong preference
for local stocks (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, and Huberman, 2001). In terms of geography
and comovement, Pirinsky and Wang (2006) document that comovement with local stocks
alters following changes in the location of rm headquarters.
Given the strong preference for local stocks, we expect greater target shareholder exit
in across state mergers and therefore greater excess comovement with the acquirer. To test
this, we classify mergers according to whether the headquarters (SDC) of the two merging
rms are located in the same state.
Insert Table 6 here
Panel A of Table 6 considers mergers across state borders. For mergers in which A > T ,
we nd that the tilt towards the acquirer beta is statistically signicant at the one percent
level. We consider same state mergers in Panel B and nd no signicant tilt towards the
acquirer. Although our geography results are weaker than our results on industry and method
of payment, they are indicative of excess comovement being greater for across state mergers.
A.5 Leverage
We follow Ghosh and Jain (2000) in computing the change in leverage due to the merger.
The leverage ratio is the scal year-end ratio of debt to total rm value. We measure debt
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as the book value of long-term debt added to the debt in current liabilities as reported by
Compustat. Total rm value is the book value of debt added to the market value of equity.
To facilitate comparison of pre and post merger leverage we construct a hypothetical merged
rm prior to announcement by pooling the balance sheet of the target and acquirer.
Figure 4 describes the leverage level from three years before the announcement to three
years after the completion to cover the beta estimation windows.
Insert Figure 4 here
Panel A considers the leverage of our entire sample while Panel B considers only cash
deals. The results parallel those of Ghosh and Jain, we nd that leverage increases as a
result of the merger. In Panel A the leverage increases by roughly seven percentage points
from three years before the announcement to three years after completion. If we consider the
time period from one year prior to the announcement to one year after completion, similar
to Ghosh and Jain, we nd that leverage increases by seven percent.
In both Panels, A and B, we have split our sample according to whether the beta of the
target is higher or lower than the beta of the acquirer. The leverage pattern is strikingly
similar irrespective of the relative riskiness of the acquirer and the target. In both cases
the leverage increases due to the merger. Since Figure 4 documents that when the beta of
the acquirer is smaller than the beta of the target, this leverage increase predicts a higher
than expected post merger beta. However, in this case, Table 3 Panel A documents that the
post merger beta is in fact lower than expected, indicating that leverage cannot explain our
results.
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Further, to make sure that leverage is not driving our results, in Table 7 we have split
our cash deals (where we predict and document the strongest e¤ect) according to whether
they have above (Panel A) or below (Panel B) median change in leverage.
Insert Table 7 here
Table 7 provides di¤erent pieces of evidence to suggest that the excess comovement is
not due to leverage. Firstly, our transactions in Panel A experience an insignicant average
(median) increase in leverage of 2:23 (2:34) percent. Nonetheless, the post merger beta is
higher than expected when the beta of the acquirer is larger than the beta of the target
(A > T ). Hence we document the e¤ect in the absence of a leverage increase. The
di¤erence between the actual and the expected post merger beta is economically signicant,
however the reduction in power implies that we cannot reject the null. Secondly, in Panel
B our transactions experience an average (median) increase in leverage of 34:30 (31:76)
percent. For deals in which the beta of the target is larger than the beta of the acquirer
(i.e., those deals where leverage increases are predicted to reduce excess comovement with
the acquirer) we nd a di¤erence between the post merger beta and the expected beta of
 0:09. This implies that the excess comovement is still economically signicant even though
leverage increases substantially. Even though the above two ndings suggest that leverage
does not explain our excess comovement, it is clear from Table 7 that leverage does inuence
estimated betas. Consider when the beta of the acquirer is larger than the beta of the
target, going from Panel A to Panel B implies an increase in the point estimate of the
excess comovement (M   E()) from 0:12 to 0:25. On the other hand, when the beta of
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the acquirer is lower than the beta of the target, going from Panel A to Panel B decreases
the median excess comovement from  0:11 to  0:05 indicating that leverage increases are
associated with increases in beta. In general, our results are weaker when the beta of the
target is greater than the beta of the acquirer which can be justied by the observed leverage
increase.
The results of this section are indicative of excess comovement being independent of
leverage, which our regression analysis below provides further evidence of.
B Regression Analysis
B.1 Deal Characteristics and Excess Comovement
In this section, we pool all transactions and use regression analysis to document the existence
of excess comovement while controlling for deal specic factors. To examine whether the
post merger beta is closer to the acquirer, we use as dependent variable excess comovement
(M   E(), equation (1)). To capture the asymmetric prediction of the tilt being positive
when A > T (see Figure 3, Panel A) and negative when T > A (see Figure 3, Panel B)
we consider as explanatory variable the conditional beta dummy (AjT ) which takes the
value of 1( 1) if the beta of the acquirer is larger (smaller) than the beta of the target. This
implies that we always expect a positive relation between AjT and our dependent variable
(M   E()). We estimate the following regression:
M   E() =  + b1(AjT ) +  0W + " (3)
where W is vector of control variables,   is a vector of coe¢ cients and " is an error term.
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Insert Table 8 here
Table 8 contains the results from our regression analysis. In the rst specication, we
estimate equation (3) without control variables. Our main variable of interest, AjT , is
positively and signicantly related to excess comovement.
Specication (2) introduces our control variables. To make sure our results are not driven
by leverage we introduce as a control variable the absolute change in leverage (dened in
section A.5 of the Empirical Findings). It is comforting that the coe¢ cient on leverage is
positive and signicant, indicating that post merger betas are increased as a result of the
leverage added in the merger. Additionally, we control for the synergies associated with the
merger and the relative market capitalization of the target. Finally, we control for changes
in comovement due to index inclusions with our dummy variable Index Inclusion.8
The e¤ect of the conditional beta dummy (AjT ) is economically signicant, going from
deals where A < T (AjT takes the value  1) to deals where A > T results in an
increase in excess comovement of 0:09 (specication (2)). This represents a 225 percent
change compared to the average excess comovement of the full sample (0:04). Put in terms
of betas, our results imply that the post merger beta of the rm increases by 0:09 when
AjT goes from  1 to 1. This represents a 8:75 percent change compared to the average
target beta in our sample.9
8In our sample we have 66 targets and 37 aquirers that change their S&P 500 status (inclusions and
deletions) from the start of the pre merger to end of the post merger estimation period. Since our goal here
is to make sure that our regression results are not driven by changes in S&P 500 status, we control for any
change in status for either acquirers or targets.
9In this regression, the estimated economic impact probably understates the true impact on target betas
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For those deals in which we expect particularly large excess comovement, cash (speci-
cation (3)), target index inclusion (specication (5)), across industry mergers (specication
(6)) and across state mergers (specication (8)), the conditional beta dummy is at least
statistically signicant at the ve percent level. However, we nd no evidence of excess
comovement in stock deals (specication (4)), same industry (specication (7)) and same
state transactions (specication (9)). As expected, there is substantial variation in economic
impact across deal characteristics. For example, the economic impact of cash transactions
and deals in which the target is included in the S&P 500 is three times the economic impact
of the full sample. Overall, the results of Table 8 demonstrate the existence of excess co-
movement while controlling for leverage and transaction synergies. The next section formally
tests whether there are di¤erences in excess comovement across deal characteristics.
B.2 Shareholder Exit and Excess Comovement
In this section, we verify that deals that should be associated with greater shareholder exit
also experience greater excess comovement. To capture that, we expect the tilt towards the
acquirers beta to be larger in cash transactions (due to the complete exit of target share-
holders), we interact our dummy variable Cash with the conditional beta dummy (AjT ).
Our prediction is that Cash transactions are associated with a greater excess comovement
than Stock deals. To test this, we keep deals nanced with 100 percent stock as our base cat-
egory and introduce interacted (with AjT ) dummy variables for all other categories (Cash,
since targets, on average, represent 35 percent of the market capitalization of the merged rm.
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Mixed and Other). Thus, specication (3) in Table 9 estimates the following regression,
M  E() = + b2(AjT Cash) + b3(AjT Mixed) + b4(AjT Other) +  0W+ "
As expected, we nd that the excess comovement with the acquirer is statistically sig-
nicantly greater for cash transactions than for stock transactions. In terms of economic
magnitude, cash transactions are associated with a 450 percent greater excess comovement
than stock transactions.
Insert Table 9
In specication (4), we consider whether the excess comovement with the acquirer is
larger in cases where the target is included in the S&P 500 as a result of the merger.
To do so, we create the dummy variable, Target Inclusion. Specically, this dummy
variable takes the value of 1 if the acquirer is included in the S&P 500 prior to the an-
nouncement whereas the target is not and the merged rm is not excluded from the S&P
500 during our post estimation window. In the regression, we interact the dummy variable
with the conditional beta dummy (AjT ). The point estimate of the coe¢ cient is positive
and economically as well as statistically (one sided test at the ten percent level) signicant.
Thus, suggesting that index inclusion is associated with signicant investor exit which results
in a larger tilt towards the comovement of the acquirer. The economic magnitude is large
and comparable to that of cash deals.
Similarly, we also consider whether the degree of excess comovement varies with other
factors such as geography and industry that investors have a clear preference for. To do so,
we create two dummy variables, Di¤erent SIC and Di¤erent State, that take the value 1 if
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target and acquirer have di¤erent SIC codes and are headquartered in di¤erent states respec-
tively and 0 otherwise. Like before, we interact the dummy variables with the conditional
beta dummy (AjT ). In specication (5), we examine whether mergers across industries
are associated with a tilt towards the acquirer. The coe¢ cient on our interaction variable
AjTDi¤erent SIC is positive and signicant in both economic and statistical terms. Fi-
nally, in specication (6), we consider whether deals in which the target and acquirer are
located in di¤erent states are associated with larger post merger beta di¤erentials. The
coe¢ cient on our interaction variable is positive and statistically signicant at the ten per-
cent level. The results of Table 9 suggest that shareholder exit signicantly impacts excess
comovement.
4 Robustness
One concern raised by Brealey et al. (2010) is that the merger transforms the targets assets to
become more like the assets of the acquirer. However, for this transformation to explain our
ndings it must be that the transformation is more rapid for cash transactions and deals in
which the target is included in the S&P 500 index. Furthermore, this transformation has to
be rather rapid since we estimate our post merger beta over 100 weeks following completion.
Additionally, we follow Brealey et al. and document the progression of comovement post
completion. If asset transformation is driving our results we would expect that the unobserver
target beta tends towards the acquirer beta over time. This has several implications. First,
the beta of the merged rm should be changing as the assets are being transformed. Second,
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when the beta of the acquirer is greater than the beta of the target (A > T ), as the beta
of the target converges to that of the acquirer the beta of the merged rm should increase.
Third, when T > A the beta of the merged rm should decrease as the transformation
progresses. To test these predictions we have estimated the post merger beta over 100 weeks
starting in eight consecutive quarters following completion.
Insert Figure 5 here
Panel A of Figure 5 considers the progression of the post merger beta for cash deals in
which A > T . Contrary to the asset transformation hypothesis we do not nd an increase
in the post merger beta over time. The beta at completion is 1:17 and the last estimated
beta is 1:08.10 The di¤erence between the two is not statistically signicant. In Panel B of
Figure 5 we consider cash deals for which T > A. There is no discernible trend in beta
over time, the beta at completion is 0:82 and the last estimated beta is 0:85. The di¤erence
is neither statistically nor economically signicant.11
5 Conclusion
Previous studies (Chan, et al., 2003, and Brealey et al., 2010) document excess comovement
in international equity markets. These papers study events in which the shareholder base of
10The corresponding post merger beta estimated in Table 3 is 1:18 (compared to 1:17 in this section). To
consider the progression in comovement we require the rm to be present in CRSP four years following the
completion and this results in a loss of three observations compared to Table 3.
11Using the overall sample we have conrmed that asset transformation is not driving our results.
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the rm is expected to change (listings and cross-border mergers) and relate this to changes
in comovement. Thereby providing evidence of international segmentation and suggesting
that stocks are priced on country level rather than internationally (see Karolyi and Stulz,
2003 for a review of the literature).
This paper provides evidence of excess comovement in US mergers and thereby of seg-
mentation on a national level. We do this by comparing a post merger beta to an expected
post merger beta based on the pre merger comovement of the target and the acquirer. We
nd that the post merger comovement is shifted towards the comovement of the acquirer.
In a similar vein, Barberis et al. (2005) document segmentation on a national level by
showing that stocks that are included into the S&P 500 experience an increase in comovement
with the S&P 500. They argue that there are investor habitats and therefore index inclusion
is associated with investor entry and exit. When we consider those target rms that are
included into the S&P 500, we nd evidence suggesting that the shift towards the acquirer
is larger corroborating the existence of a S&P 500 habitat. Additionally, we verify that our
results remain qualitatively unchanged even in the absence of index inclusion. Relying on
mergers for identication rather than index inclusion has the advantage that we can consider
segmentation along other dimensions over which investors may show a preference for, such
as industry, geographic location (e.g., Pirinsky and Wang, 2006) and index membership.
Identifying excess comovement relies on two assumptions; rst that there is entry or exit
of investors associated with the event and second that nothing else is altered as a result of the
event. Arguably, rms may undergo signicant changes as a result of a merger (e.g., leverage
may increase) and therefore, it is important that we are careful in considering alternative
stories. However, for any alternative story to explain our results it must be the case that the
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explanation generates asymmetric predictions with respect to the relative riskiness of the
acquirer and the target. That is, the story has to jointly explain why the post merger beta
is greater than expected when the comovement with the market of the acquirer is greater
than that of the target and why the post merger beta is smaller than expected when the
target is riskier than the acquirer. For example in terms of leverage, it must increase in one
set of transactions and decrease for the complement. In particular, we control for changes
in leverage and synergies in our analysis.
Given the mounting evidence that markets are segmented (both internationally and na-
tionally), this suggests that care should be taken when estimating betas in situations in
which a signicant proportion of the investor base has been altered.
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Figure 1
Timeline
This figure depicts the timeline of our research design. During the pre run-up period, which lasts for 100 weeks and ends eight weeks
prior to the merger announcement, we estimate the betas for the acquiror (βA) and the target (βT ). E(β) is the market value weighted
average of these betas, adjusted for a possible toehold. The run-up period, covering the eight weeks prior to announcement, is excluded
from the estimation period due to the possibility of informed trading. The post merger period lasts for 100 weeks after completion. In
this period we estimate the beta of the merged firm, βM .
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Figure 2
Comovement changes in mergers
These figures illustrate changes in comovement as a result of the merger. Panel A illustrates the deals for which βA > βT and Panel B
the deals for which βA < βT . The horizontal axis represents the timing of the merger: (-1) is the pre and (1) the post merger period.
βA and βT are the pre merger betas of the acquirer and target respectively. E(β) is the expected beta of the merged firm, calculated
as the market value weighted average of βA and βT , adjusted for a possible toehold. Finally, βM is the beta of the merged firm after
completion.
(a) Panel A: βA > βT (b) Panel B: βT > βA
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Figure 3
Comovement changes in cash mergers
These figures illustrate changes in comovement as a result of the merger for cash deals only. Panel A illustrates the deals for which
βA > βT and Panel B the deals for which βA < βT . The horizontal axis represents the timing of the merger: (-1) is the pre and (1)
the post merger period. βA and βT are the pre merger betas of the acquirer and target respectively. E(β) is the expected beta of the
merged firm, calculated as the market value weighted average of βA and βT , adjusted for a possible toehold. Finally, βM is the beta of
the merged firm after completion.
(a) Panel A: βA > βT (b) Panel B: βT > βA
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Figure 4
Average change in leverage around mergers
This figure illustrates the average change in leverage around mergers. Panel A contains the data of the full sample while Panel B
contains cash deals only. Furthermore, the data is split according to whether βA > βT or βA < βT . Leverage is defined as the
end-of-year ratio of the sum of the acquirer’s and target’s book value of debt to the sum of the acquirer’s and target’s total market
value. Total market value is defined as book value of debt plus the market value of equity. Book value of debt is defined as the sum
of long-term debt (Compustat-Item dltt) plus debt in current liabilities (Compustat-Item dlc). The leverage levels are shown for the
three years prior to announcement and the three years after completion.
(a) Panel A: Full Sample (b) Panel B: Cash Transactions
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Figure 5
Progression of the merged firm’s beta
This figure depicts the progression of the merged firm’s beta over time. Panel A illustrates the deals for which βA > βT and Panel B
the deals for which βA < βT . The horizontal axis represents the timing of the merger: (-1) is the pre merger period, (0) the completion
period and positive numbers are quarters after completion (one to eight). During the pre run-up period, which lasts for 100 weeks and
ends eight weeks prior to the merger announcement, we estimate the betas for the acquirer (βA) and the target (βT ). The beta of the
merged firm, βM , is estimated for the first time at completion using 100 weeks of data. In each of the consecutive eight quarters, the
beta of the merged firm is estimated anew using 100 weeks of data.
(a) Panel A: βA > βT (b) Panel B: βT > βA
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Table 1
Summary statistics of our main variables
We present descriptive statistics for our main variables. MV Target and MV Acquirer is the market value
in Mio. USD of the target and the acquirer firm eight weeks prior to deal announcement. Target Weight is
the ratio of MV Target to the combined market value, MV Target plus MV Acquirer, adjusted for a possible
toehold. Leverage ex-ante is the end-of-year ratio of the sum of the acquirer’s and target’s book value of debt
to the combined total market value for the year prior to announcement. Total market value is defined as
book value of debt plus market value of equity. Book value of debt is calculated as the sum of long-term debt
(Compustat-Item dltt) plus debt in current liabilities (Compustat-Item dlc). Leverage ex-post is calculated
analogously for the year after deal completion. Synergies is the ratio of the combined, market adjusted
abnormal value (target and acquirer) created over a six week window around the merger announcement
(three weeks before and three weeks after) relative to the combined market value of the target and acquirer
eight weeks prior to the merger announcement. Synergies are winsorized at the one and 99 percent level. λ is
the toehold the acquirer owns at deal announcement. β’s are estimated using weekly data over a 100 weeks
estimation period. βA is the acquirer’s and βT the target’s beta based on an estimation window ending eight
weeks prior to deal announcement. E(β) is the expected beta of the merged firm, calculated as market value
(MV Target and MV Acquirer) weighted average of βA and βT , adjusted for possible toeholds. βM is the
beta of the merged firm calculated after deal completion. All β’s are winsorized at the one and 99 percent
level.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
MV Target (Mio.) 2’360 7’117 461 28 81’900 712
MV Acquirer (Mio.) 4’928 17’000 987 22 230’000 712
Target Weight 34.47% 15.74% 32.49% 2.74% 79.77% 712
Leverage ex-ante 23.91% 18.02% 21.05% 0.00% 83.66% 693
Leverage ex-post 31.74% 23.38% 28.27% 0.00% 94.99% 703
Synergies 6.23% 16.76% 5.08% -38.59% 68.71% 712
λ 2.95% 12.87% 0.00% 0.00% 95.35% 712
βA 1.05 0.60 0.98 -0.27 3.01 712
βT 1.03 0.64 0.98 -0.59 3.16 712
E(β) 1.05 0.54 1.00 -0.31 2.90 712
βM 1.09 0.57 1.03 -0.44 2.78 712
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Table 2
Univariate Results for the full sample
We present univariate results for the full sample according to whether βA > βT (columns 2 and 3) or
βA < βT (columns 4 and 5). βA and βT are the pre merger betas of the acquirer and the target. E(β) is
the expected merged beta, calculated as the market value weighted average of the target and the acquirer
beta. Weights are adjusted for a possible toehold. βM is the actual merged beta and βM − E(β) is Excess
Comovement. We report mean and median test statistics (in brackets) for Excess Comovement being positive
(βM − E(β) > 0) when βA > βT and negative (βM − E(β) < 0) when βA < βT . βImpT is the implicit value
of the target beta which would be required for βM = E(β) to hold. β
Imp
T − βT is the difference between
the implicit and the observed target beta. Testing procedure and statistics are as above. Change is the
difference between βImpT and βT in percent. All betas are winsorized at the one and 99 percent level. Test
statistics are reported for one sided tests with the significance levels of ten percent(*), five percent(**) and
one percent(***).
Overall Sample
βA > βT βT > βA
Mean Median Mean Median
βA 1.24 1.19 0.85 0.80
βT 0.78 0.75 1.30 1.18
E(β) 1.09 1.04 1.00 0.96
βM 1.18 1.11 0.99 0.94
βM − E(β) 0.09*** 0.06*** -0.01 -0.05
(3.08) (2.47) (-0.45) (-0.71)
βImpT 1.05 0.93 1.26 1.10
βImpT − βT 0.27** 0.18** -0.04 -0.08
(2.32) (1.95) (-0.43) (-0.66)
Change 34.2% 23.4% -3.2% -7.2%
N 372 372 340 340
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Table 3
Univariate results according to method of payment
We present univariate results for different methods of payment. Panel A restricts the full sample to cash
deals only while Panel B considers pure stock deals. We measure Excess Comovement according to whether
βA > βT (columns 2, 3, 6 and 7) or βA < βT (columns 4, 5, 8 and 9). βA and βT are the pre merger betas
of the acquirer and the target. E(β) is the expected merged beta, calculated as the market value weighted
average of the target and the acquirer beta. Weights are adjusted for a possible toehold. βM is the actual
merged beta and βM−E(β) is Excess Comovement. We report mean and median test statistics (in brackets)
for Excess Comovement being positive (βM −E(β) > 0) when βA > βT and negative (βM −E(β) < 0) when
βA < βT . β
Imp
T is the implicit value of the target beta which would be required for βM = E(β) to hold.
βImpT − βT is the difference between the implicit and the observed target beta. Testing procedure and
statistics are as above. Change is the difference between βImpT and βT in percent. All betas are winsorized
at the one and 99 percent level. Test statistics are reported for one sided tests with the significance levels
of ten percent(*), five percent(**) and one percent(***).
Panel A: Cash Deals Panel B: Stock Deals
βA > βT βT > βA βA > βT βT > βA
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
βA 1.14 1.14 0.76 0.73 1.36 1.26 0.96 0.89
βT 0.70 0.69 1.21 1.10 0.86 0.83 1.43 1.22
E(β) 0.97 0.99 0.93 0.87 1.20 1.12 1.11 1.02
βM 1.18 1.12 0.84 0.83 1.23 1.18 1.11 1.03
βM − E(β) 0.20*** 0.14*** -0.09** -0.11** 0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.04
(2.97) (2.42) (-1.70) (-1.77) (0.70) (0.24) (-0.06) (-0.18)
βImpT 1.03 1.07 0.88 0.93 0.96 0.66 1.39 1.29
βImpT − βT 0.32* 0.38** -0.33** -0.17** 0.11 -0.17 -0.04 0.07
(1.41) (1.88) (-1.94) (-1.75) (0.56) (-0.05) (-0.20) (0.12)
Change 46.1% 54.5% -27.5% -15.2% 12.7% -20.2% -2.5% 5.8%
N 66 66 58 58 148 148 115 115
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Table 4
Univariate results according to index inclusion
We present univariate results for index inclusion. Panel A restricts the full sample to deals where the
target has become part of the S&P 500 Index as a result of the transaction. Panel B restricts the full
sample to only cash deals that are not affected by any change in S&P 500 listing status. We measure Excess
Comovement according to whether βA > βT (columns 2, 3, 6 and 7) or βA < βT (columns 4, 5, 8 and 9).
βA and βT are the pre merger betas of the acquirer and the target. E(β) is the expected merged beta,
calculated as the market value weighted average of the target and the acquirer beta. Weights are adjusted
for a possible toehold. βM is the actual merged beta and βM − E(β) is Excess Comovement. We report
mean and median test statistics (in brackets) for Excess Comovement being positive (βM −E(β) > 0) when
βA > βT and negative (βM −E(β) < 0) when βA < βT . βImpT is the implicit value of the target beta which
would be required for βM = E(β) to hold. β
Imp
T −βT is the difference between the implicit and the observed
target beta. Testing procedure and statistics are as above. Change is the difference between βImpT and βT in
percent. All betas are winsorized at the one and 99 percent level. Test statistics are reported for one sided
tests with the significance levels of ten percent(*), five percent(**) and one percent(***).
Panel A: Target Index Incl. Panel B: Cash Deals w/o Index Incl.
βA > βT βT > βA βA > βT βT > βA
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
βA 0.98 0.87 0.92 0.92 1.14 1.16 0.75 0.73
βT 0.68 0.60 1.32 1.32 0.68 0.65 1.21 1.08
E(β) 0.89 0.80 1.03 1.08 0.96 1.01 0.93 0.87
βM 1.00 0.86 0.87 0.93 1.17 1.13 0.83 0.82
βM − E(β) 0.11 0.13 -0.15*** -0.13*** 0.21*** 0.16*** -0.09** -0.11**
(1.15) (1.09) (-2.54) (-2.54) (2.89) (2.31) (-1.69) (-1.75)
βImpT 0.84 0.84 0.71 0.79 1.09 1.02 0.89 0.98
βImpT − βT 0.16 0.23 -0.62** -0.53*** 0.41** 0.37** -0.32** -0.11*
(0.41) (0.58) (-2.37) (-2.56) (1.71) (1.83) (-1.84) (-1.65)
Change 23.8% 38.8% -46.6% -40.1% 59.7% 56.8% -26.4% -9.7%
N 32 32 29 29 57 57 52 52
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Table 5
Univariate results according to industry
We present univariate results for intra versus inter industry mergers. Panel A restricts the full sample
to across industry deals (different SIC) only while Panel B considers within industry deals (same SIC)
exclusively. We measure Excess Comovement according to whether βA > βT (columns 2, 3, 6 and 7) or
βA < βT (columns 4, 5, 8 and 9). βA and βT are the pre merger betas of the acquirer and the target.
E(β) is the expected merged beta, calculated as the market value weighted average of the target and the
acquirer beta. Weights are adjusted for a possible toehold. βM is the actual merged beta and βM − E(β)
is Excess Comovement. We report mean and median test statistics (in brackets) for Excess Comovement
being positive (βM − E(β) > 0) when βA > βT and negative (βM − E(β) < 0) when βA < βT . βImpT is the
implicit value of the target beta which would be required for βM = E(β) to hold. β
Imp
T −βT is the difference
between the implicit and the observed target beta. Testing procedure and statistics are as above. Change
is the difference between βImpT and βT in percent. All betas are winsorized at the one and 99 percent level.
Test statistics are reported for one sided tests with the significance levels of ten percent(*), five percent(**)
and one percent(***).
Panel A: Different SIC Panel B: Same SIC
βA > βT βT > βA βA > βT βT > βA
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
βA 1.27 1.23 0.83 0.77 1.19 1.11 0.88 0.85
βT 0.77 0.74 1.28 1.18 0.80 0.76 1.32 1.18
E(β) 1.11 1.07 0.98 0.90 1.06 1.00 1.03 1.02
βM 1.23 1.15 0.97 0.93 1.09 1.06 1.02 0.95
βM − E(β) 0.13*** 0.11*** -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.08
(3.15) (2.78) (-0.51) (-0.45) (0.87) (0.33) (-0.11) (-0.54)
βImpT 1.17 0.97 1.22 1.15 0.87 0.84 1.30 1.09
βImpT − βT 0.40*** 0.23** -0.06 -0.03 0.07 0.08 -0.02 -0.09
(2.49) (2.26) (-0.46) (-0.32) (0.43) (0.19) (-0.12) (-0.65)
Change 51.9% 31.2% -4.6% -2.8% 8.5% 9.9% -1.4% -7.5%
N 224 224 197 197 148 148 143 143
40
Table 6
Univariate results according to geography
We present univariate results for within and across State mergers. Panel A restricts the full sample to
across State deals (different State) only while Panel B considers within State deals (same State) exclusively.
We measure Excess Comovement according to whether βA > βT (columns 2, 3, 6 and 7) or βA < βT (columns
4, 5, 8 and 9). βA and βT are the pre merger betas of the acquirer and the target. E(β) is the expected
merged beta, calculated as the market value weighted average of the target and the acquirer beta. Weights
are adjusted for a possible toehold. βM is the actual merged beta and βM−E(β) is Excess Comovement. We
report mean and median test statistics (in brackets) for Excess Comovement being positive (βM −E(β) > 0)
when βA > βT and negative (βM − E(β) < 0) when βA < βT . βImpT is the implicit value of the target beta
which would be required for βM = E(β) to hold. β
Imp
T − βT is the difference between the implicit and the
observed target beta. Testing procedure and statistics are as above. Change is the difference between βImpT
and βT in percent. All betas are winsorized at the one and 99 percent level. Test statistics are reported for
one sided tests with the significance levels of ten percent(*), five percent(**) and one percent(***).
Panel A: Different State Panel B: Same State
βA > βT βT > βA βA > βT βT > βA
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
βA 1.23 1.17 0.86 0.83 1.26 1.22 0.84 0.73
βT 0.77 0.72 1.32 1.18 0.81 0.81 1.23 1.19
E(β) 1.08 1.01 1.01 0.96 1.10 1.09 0.99 0.87
βM 1.18 1.12 0.99 0.95 1.17 1.09 1.00 0.93
βM − E(β) 0.10*** 0.07*** -0.02 -0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.04
(2.90) (2.47) (-0.76) (-1.01) (1.09) (0.51) (0.31) (0.30)
βImpT 1.09 0.92 1.25 1.08 0.93 1.03 1.26 1.26
βImpT − βT 0.31*** 0.20** -0.07 -0.10 0.12 0.22 0.02 0.06
(2.35) (1.94) (-0.55) (-0.98) (0.52) (0.53) (0.15) (0.41)
Change 40.6% 27.9% -5.0% -8.1% 14.4% 27.0% 1.9% 5.1%
N 285 285 249 249 87 87 91 91
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Table 7
Univariate results for changes in leverage
We present univariate results for different level of changes in leverage. We restrict the sample to cash
deals only. Panel A contains all deals where the change in leverage is below the median (Q1) change. Panel
B includes all deals where the change in leverage is above the median (Q2) change. The mean (median)
change in leverage is reported in the second row of each panel. We measure Excess Comovement according
to whether βA > βT (columns 2, 3, 6 and 7) or βA < βT (columns 4, 5, 8 and 9). βA and βT are the pre
merger betas of the acquirer and the target. E(β) is the expected merged beta, calculated as the market
value weighted average of the target and the acquirer beta. Weights are adjusted for a possible toehold.
βM is the actual merged beta and βM − E(β) is Excess Comovement. We report mean and median test
statistics (in brackets) for Excess Comovement being positive (βM −E(β) > 0) when βA > βT and negative
(βM − E(β) < 0) when βA < βT . βImpT is the implicit value of the target beta which would be required
for βM = E(β) to hold. β
Imp
T − βT is the difference between the implicit and the observed target beta.
Testing procedure and statistics are as above. Change is the difference between βImpT and βT in percent.
All betas are winsorized at the one and 99 percent level. Test statistics are reported for one sided tests with
the significance levels of ten percent(*), five percent(**) and one percent(***).
Panel A: ∆ Leverage Q1 Panel B: ∆ Leverage Q2
2.23% (2.34%) 34.70% (32.04%)
βA > βT βT > βA βA > βT βT > βA
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
βA 1.24 1.14 0.77 0.72 1.10 1.16 0.70 0.70
βT 0.76 0.72 1.26 1.10 0.72 0.76 1.13 1.02
E(β) 1.10 1.01 0.93 0.89 0.92 0.97 0.90 0.83
βM 1.22 1.17 0.84 0.84 1.17 1.11 0.80 0.80
βM − E(β) 0.12 0.06 -0.09* -0.11* 0.25*** 0.16** -0.09 -0.05
(1.20) (0.80) (-1.33) (-1.38) (2.47) (2.06) (-1.06) (-1.02)
βImpT 0.86 0.85 0.75 0.81 1.06 1.26 0.98 0.98
βImpT − βT 0.10 0.39 -0.51** -0.28** 0.34 0.49** -0.15 -0.04
(0.27) (0.00) (-1.99) (-1.76) (1.21) (2.00) (-0.94) (-0.76)
Change 13.5% 19.0% -40.3% -25.7% 47.9% 64.5% -13.3% -4.1%
N 26 26 32 32 35 35 22 22
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Table 9
Regression results for the full sample
We present the regression results with Excess Comovement (βM −E(β)) as our dependent variable. βA|βT
measures relative riskiness and is equal to (−1) for βA < βT and 1 for βA > βT . βA|βT×Cash, βA|βT×Mixed
and βA|βT × Other are interaction variables of the dummy variables of cash, mixed and other deals with
βA|βT . The base category in Regression (3) is pure stock deals. βA|βT ×Target Inclusion is an interaction
variable of Target Inclusion, a dummy equal to one in case the Target is included in the S&P500 Index
as a result of the merger, with βA|βT . βA|βT × Different SIC is an interaction variable of Different
SIC, a dummy equal to one in case the SIC of the acquirer and the target are different, with βA|βT .
βA|βT × DifferentState is an interaction variable of Different State, a dummy equal to one in case the
State of the acquirer and the the target are different, with βA|βT . Target Weight is the market capitalization
of the the target company, adjusted for toeholds, relative to the combined market capitalization of the target
and the acquirer firm eight weeks prior to the merger announcement. Change in Leverage is the difference
in end-of-year leverage of the combined balance sheet (target and acquirer) one year prior to the merger
announcement to the merged firm end-of-year leverage one year after the completion of the deal. Leverage
is measured as book value of debt to total market value which is defined as book value of debt plus market
value of equity. Change in Leverage is winsorized at the one and 99 percent level. Synergies is the ratio
of the target’s and acquirer’s combined market adjusted abnormal value created over a six week window
around the merger announcement (three weeks before to three weeks after) relative to the combined market
value eight weeks prior to the merger announcement. Index Inclusion is a control variable equal to one if
either the acquirer or the target changed their S&P 500 listing status from the beginning of the pre to the
end of the post merger estimation window. All regressions control for a deal announcement year fixed-effect.
T-statistics based on robust standard errors are calculated for a one sided test (βM−E(β) > 0) and reported
in brackets with significance levels of ten percent(*), five percent(**) and one percent(***).
Dependent Variable: βM − E(β)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βA|βT 0.052*** 0.045**
(2.56) (2.18)
βA|βT x Cash 0.135***
(2.97)
βA|βT x Other 0.055*
(1.43)
βA|βT x Mixed -0.002
(-0.04)
βA|βT x Target Inclusion 0.132***
(2.38)
βA|βT x Different SIC 0.066***
(2.41)
βA|βT x Different State 0.057***
(2.45)
Target Share -0.064 -0.080 -0.079 -0.057 -0.072
(-0.44) (-0.54) (-0.53) (-0.39) (-0.49)
Change in Leverage 0.002* 0.002 0.002* 0.002 0.002*
(1.29) (1.17) (1.38) (1.28) (1.33)
Synergies Share 0.224* 0.212* 0.232** 0.229** 0.231**
(1.61) (1.51) (1.66) (1.65) (1.66)
Index Inclusion -0.033 -0.039 -0.040 -0.030 -0.032
(-0.66) (-0.78) (-0.82) (-0.61) (-0.63)
Constant 0.04** 0.040 0.050 0.046* 0.037 0.040
(1.95) (0.77) (0.96) (0.87) (0.71) (0.78)
N 712 685 685 685 685 685
R-squared 0.009 0.016 0.023 0.014 0.017 0.017
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